Migrantophobia on the rise
We described how Russia’s migration policy was formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union in a previous article. This text focuses on recent changes and trends that have gained momentum since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Racial profiling, vigilante patrols, and the police
On June 10 2025, a woman from Buryatia was illegally detained and taken to a police station for a “document check”. Men in military uniforms with Z patches, calling themselves “druzhinniki”, were checking the documents of people they described as having an “Asian appearance”. “Druzhinniki” were later identified as members of the “Russkaya Obshchina” (meaning “Russian community”) – Russia’s largest far-right movement and neo-Nazi organisation.
Human rights defender Aleksander Kim commented for Beda on the situation:
Such cases happen regularly. The ones I encountered were less severe, as I was documenting these stories before the [full-scale — ed.] war against Ukraine… Since the onset of the war, the situation has worsened significantly: there are no external checks on the regime in Russia, and the state no longer even attempts to mask its Nazi nature. Previously, such external oversight was ensured by Russia’s membership in the Council of Europe, which allowed appeals of Russian court decisions to the European Court of Human Rights.[1]
Individuals from Russia’s Asian peoples, despite being Russian citizens, face xenophobia and racism alongside migrants from Central Asia. For migrants, the situation is further complicated by their reduced legal protections.
The key criterion used by Russian police when selecting people for document checks is ethnicity. Undoubtedly, the police officers are instructed to do so. This is likely communicated through unofficial but mandatory oral orders: to look for those violating migration law by deliberately checking “people of non-Slavic appearance
Aleksander Kim, human rights defender
Such checks and detentions in public places illustrate racial profiling in Russia. This discriminatory practice involves law enforcement forces and other bodies suspecting, stopping, or checking people based on the social construct of race, leading to systemic inequality.
Aggressive actions of “druzhinniki” against “people of non-Slavic appearance” demonstrate the rise of far-right neo-Nazi groups in Russia, while their impunity reflects the support these groups receive from law enforcement authorities, as well as the high level of xenophobia in Russian society.
Crocus City Hall
Xenophobia, migrantophobia, and Islamophobia—which in Russia are so closely intertwined as to be nearly indistinguishable—increased throughout the country following the attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall department store on March 22, 2024. ISIS militants claimed responsibility for the attack.
In the following days, 11 suspects were arrested, including, according to investigators, four participants in the attack: Dalerdzhon Mirzoev, Saidakrami Murodali Rachabalidoz, Muhammadsobir Faizov, and Shamsiddin Faridun. During the detention, security officers cut off part of the ear of one of the suspects, 30-year-old Radzhad Alizade. This occurred after the man had been captured and restrained. On the same day, several Telegram channels affiliated with security forces published videos showing signs of torture.
On March 24, 2024, the suspects appeared before the Basmanny District Court, all with signs of torture, injuries, and beatings. One of them, Muhammadsobir Faizov, was brought to the hearing in a wheelchair. Russian security forces had previously used torture during investigations, but never so openly and demonstratively[2].
State media broadcasting the hearing highlighted the signs of torture. According to a source at one of the federal TV channels speaking to Verstka[3], “reporters were instructed ‘not to show directly, but to emphasize’ how the suspects’ appearances differ from those on their social media.” In conversations with journalists, security officers did not hide that the “public demonstration of torture ‘was sanctioned’ and that they were interested in its widest possible distribution.”[4]
This is an unprecedented step toward the normalisation of violence, effectively giving a green light to various right-wing organizations in Russia, which often collaborate directly with the police. Raids on public transport—such as the detention of a woman by “Russkaya Obshchina” in Moscow—as well as raids on immigrants’ homes, workplaces, and places of worship, are often carried out jointly by the police and “druzhinniki”.[5]
New methods of digital surveillance of migrants: the Register of controlled individuals and the “Amina” app
Another outcome of the anti-migrant campaign following the attack on Crocus City Hall is the creation of the Register of Controlled Individuals, which came into force on February 5, 2025. This database contains information on foreign nationals and persons without Russian citizenship who, under the current migration law, have no legal grounds to remain in Russia. Foreign nationals are not notified that they have been added to the Register. They can learn about it only by entering their data into the search tools on the websites of Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Gosuslugi public services portal.[6]
What does this mean in practice, and how is it that by September 2025—just half a year after its launch—the Register contained over 770,000 people, one third of them women and children?
Individuals are entered into the Register if they lack the documents or certificates required to obtain migration status or citizenship; if they are not registered in the place of residence or stay; or if their labor patent, work permit, or employment contract has not been renewed, among other reasons. More often than not, people are added to the Register due to mistakes in their documentation or errors in the electronic registration system.
As many Central Asian media outlets have reported, such systemic errors are still blamed on the migrants. For instance, Current Time covered[7] the story of Kyrgyz citizen Nurbek Eshmatov, who was entered into the Register due to a system malfunction. He tried to prove his case to the migration authorities for two weeks but was unsuccessful, despite submitting a complete set of required documents. Azatlyk Radio reported[8] the stories of several students from Kazakhstan, who faced the same problem. The Ministry of Internal Affairs gave them no explanation for why they had been added to the Register, citing only a system malfunction and warning that similar errors could occur until the system is fully operational.
In a comment to Current Time, migration lawyer Mirlan Toktobekov noted: “Even the staff of the authorities do not always know the criteria by which the Register is compiled or what needs to be done to remove a person from it.”[9]
Migrants added to the Register face numerous restrictions: they are not allowed to register a marriage or divorce, enroll their children in educational institutions, drive a car, open new bank accounts, or spend more than 30,000 rubles per month from existing accounts.
In Moscow and the Moscow Region, traditional hubs for migrant flows, the restrictions are even more severe. On September 1, 2025, authorities in Moscow and the Moscow Region introduced an “experimental system for tracking the location of foreign nationals via the mobile app “Amina”. Installation of the app is mandatory for citizens of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Ukraine who come to the region for work[10].
“Amina” is the only path for migrants to be registered in Moscow and the Moscow Region. The app delivers geolocation data to the Ministry of Internal Affairs daily. If the individual does not provide their data within three working days, their registration status at the so-called Multifunctional Migration Center is revoked. This can lead to inclusion in the Register of Controlled Individuals[11]. Although some human rights lawyers had hoped[12] that the app might help migrants avoid unlawful police checks, according to Valentina Chupik, the situation looks different: “This experiment [of registering through the app] assumes that once you are registered in “Amina”, if you have it, no papers are needed. But that doesn’t mean Russian police have stopped demanding paper registration—either because they don’t know it’s unnecessary or because they don’t want to know it. They just want to rip off migrants. In just two days, I have already received a pile of complaints from people.”[13]
What do lawyers think of this? Valeria Vetoshkina, a lawyer at “Stoparmy Movement”, commented for Beda:
The initiative involving the Amina app appears to be a logical stage in the digitalisation of migration registration and the strengthening of control at a time when the state is pursuing stricter monitoring of foreign citizens. It may increase efficiency, reduce bureaucracy, and speed up the process for many. However, from the standpoint of human rights, migrants’ rights, and equality before the law, there are significant risks. Particularly concerning are constant surveillance through geolocation, the system’s limited flexibility due to its technical requirements, and its imbalance — the burden falls specifically on a certain group of migrants. If the system is implemented without sufficient safeguards — namely, an accessible version of the app, procedures for those without smartphones, clear and transparent rules, data protection, and a mechanism for appealing decisions — serious legal and ethical problems may arise”.
The digitalisation of migration control is also underway in Saint Petersburg. In August 2025, it became known that 50,000 municipal surveillance cameras had been equipped with a so-called “nationality recognition system. The cameras classify people into six “racial types,” and the installation of the system was justified as a way to “identify concentrations of certain nationalities.[14, 15]
On September 10, 2025, the deadline for “legalising” the status of migrants listed in the Register passed. Anyone unable to have their name removed from the list will now be required to leave the country.
“Anyone who has not legalised their stay in Russia must leave the country and inform the authorities of the date, place, and route of their planned departure.. Otherwise, the migrant may face forced removal* and a fine. After that, they will be banned from entering Russia for at least five years,” stated Vyacheslav Volodin, Chairman of the State Duma, in early October[16].
In Russia’s legal language, the procedure for the forced departure of foreign citizens is called “removal beyond the country’s borders.” The term is discriminatory and demeaning — one of the tools used to dehumanise migrants. Unfortunately, because such formulations appear in legal documents, they also make their way into the media and everyday speech. The editorial team of Beda opposes uncritical repetition of such terms.
"Being included in the Register strips a person of all rights: they cannot access healthcare, study, marry, or use their bank cards. Essentially, the only right they are left with is to pack their belongings and leave. Creating such a Register is a direct violation of the Russian Constitution, which guarantees fundamental rights to everyone on Russian soil, not just citizens," said human rights defender Svetlana Gannushkina, chair of the committee “Civic Assistance,” commenting on the creation of the Register[17].
Amendments to the School Education Law
Сhanges in Russian law-making also affect migrant children. As of April 1, new rules for admission to public schools came into force[18]. All prospective students from grades 1 through 11 are now required to pass a Russian-language proficiency test. Under the grading criteria, students must score at least 90 percent to be admitted, yet no free preparatory courses are available. For thousands of children, this effectively means being denied access to education and the opportunity to integrate and socialise.
Migrant children with developmental and learning disabilities will effectively be barred from attending school: there are neither exemptions nor adapted tests for them. While schools offer adapted curricula, all children are required to take the same language test. For children with developmental disabilities, the chances of passing it are close to zero.
This is an unprecedented situation: nowhere else in the world are there such restrictions on education for migrants as in present-day Russia. In most host countries, migrant children have access to preparatory classes where they can focus on learning the language first. Academic subjects are gradually added once language skills improve.
In addition to the testing requirements, the law effectively introduces segregation in the school system. This violates the provisions of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by Russia, as well as the country’s Constitution, which in Article 43 guarantees all children residing in the country — regardless of citizenship or migration status — the right to free secondary education.
Valeria Vetoshkina clarifies:
International standards, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child, explicitly prohibit restricting access to education based on citizenship, language, or migration status. Without compensatory measures, such a law could therefore be considered discriminatory. In effect, this is not about testing knowledge but about creating a filter that shifts the responsibility for integrating migrant children from the state onto families, who often have neither the resources nor the opportunity to teach their children Russian.
The impact of the new law is already evident at the start of the 2025/2026 school year. According to Russia’s Federal Service for Supervision in Education and Science[19] , only around 13 percent of children of foreign nationals who intended to enroll in Russian schools were actually admitted. The remainder could not pass the Russian language test[20].
Sergey Mironov, one of the proponents of stricter migration policies and leader of the “A Just Russia” party, openly states the law’s objective: “To limit the stay of migrants’ family members in the country and reduce the burden on the social sector. Many of our initiatives aim at this: those who want to work may do so, but without families and without claims to benefits, healthcare, access to schools, or anything else!”[21]
On October 15, 2025, Putin signed the Concept of State Migration Policy for 2026–2030[22]. One of the stated goals of the policy is “reducing the number of migrant children who do not attend educational institutions.” Given the restrictive amendments to the Education Law, this goal can be achieved in only one way: by preventing migrant children from entering Russia.
The signed Concept effectively legitimises and enshrines as state policy the goals of Russian migration policy previously voiced by Mironov. These goals aim to establish total control over labor migrants, ensuring they come solely for short-term or seasonal work, without bringing families, who are viewed as “a burden on the social system”. The Concept describes migrants as “an auxiliary means to address economic problems,” specifically to supply labor for priority sectors of the Russian economy “during periods of national labor shortages”. New requirements include that migrants must uphold “traditional values” and refrain from forming “ethnic enclaves.”
Expanded police powers, deportations, and entry bans: who is at greatest risk?
According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as of spring 2025[23] there were 6.3 million foreign nationals living in Russia. The ten countries with the largest numbers of citizens in Russia: are Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, China, and Turkmenistan. NB: Ukrainian migration statistics are unreliable, as they include residents of occupied territories and forcibly displaced persons.
Around 60% of all foreign nationals in Russia are migrants from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan. Migration flows remain steady, largely due to difficult economic conditions in their home countries and visa-free entry. However, these same groups are also the main targets of xenophobia, police harassment, and systemic racism.
Valeria Vetoshkina, a lawyer at “Stoparmy Movement”, explains:
Current migration legislation in Russia is primarily aimed at tightening control over migrants from visa-free Central Asian countries — Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. These groups are especially vulnerable, since their stay in Russia depends entirely on administrative procedures: registration, digital apps like ‘Amina,’ migration tracking, and the work permit system. All recent measures — from shortening visa-free stays to creating the ‘Register of Controlled Individuals’ and requiring registration through mobile apps — increase labor migrants’ dependence on the state and leave them less protected. While officially presented as an effort to streamline migration, in practice it amounts to total control and selective access.
In 2024, Russian courts ordered over 190,000 foreign nationals to leave the country[24] — a new record, surpassing the 177,800 expulsions in 2015. More than 157,000 were forced to leave, a 45% increase compared to 2023. Authorities also issued 267,200 entry bans, nearly 94,000 more than in 2023. Meanwhile, in 2024, the number of temporary residence permits issued was cut in half, and the number of permanent residence permits fell by almost a quarter.
Since the beginning of 2025, Russia has already deported 35,000 migrants who, as claimed by law enforcement authorities, violated the country’s stay regulations[25]. In August 2025, Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs also reported[26] that 791 foreign nationals had their Russian citizenship revoked in the first half of the year.
Before 2025, official decisions concerning the deportation of foreign nationals had to go through the courts. On February 5, 2025, amendments to the law came into effect, allowing officials from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) to issue deportation orders directly[27]. Before the amendments, if a foreign national committed an administrative offense upon entering the country, the border service would make the decision. Under the new rules, however, deportation orders can be issued by the leadership of regional MIA offices, migration departments, and police officers.
Entry rules have also tightened. Since June 30, 2025, migrants must notify Russian authorities in advance of any planned trip, submitting the purpose of their visit at least 72 hours before entering the country[28]. This can only be done by filling out a form in the “Gosuslugi RuID” app.
Migrants also face violations of their rights when trying to enter Russia. Following the attack on Crocus City Hall, detentions, interrogations, and screening at the border have become common practice, particularly at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo and Zhukovsky airports.
On August 1, Radio Azattyk reported[29] that police detained several people from Kyrgyzstan in an overcrowded room at Zhukovsky Airport. A woman who asked to remain anonymous told the outlet that she and several other passengers on a flight from Osh were brought in for questioning upon arrival in Moscow. Police asked her why she wore a hijab and tried to accuse her of viewing extremist content on her phone. In the beginning of 2025, Migrant.Uz recorded[30] an increase in refusals of entry into Russia for Uzbek citizens. These decisions were usually made by border officials after lengthy questioning and phone checks, without issuing any official documents stating the reason for refusal. Entry bans have no expiration date.
Kursiv reported[31] that in July 2025, at least 20 citizens of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were denied entry to Russia after their phones were checked. In some cases, the refusals were based on subscriptions to radical religious accounts or viewing their sermons. Border officers also found messages criticising Russian security services on travelers’ phones. In all known cases, the migrants were unable to challenge the entry bans in court.
War recruitment and forced service
Russian security forces, in collaboration with right-wing groups, regularly raid migrant communities. The raids frequently feature police violence. A summer 2025 operation in Yekaterinburg targeting Azerbaijani labor migrants left two dead, two hospitalized in critical condition, and more than 50 people detained. Eyewitnesses reported that the police acted with extreme brutality[32]. Amid the diplomatic crisis between Russia and Azerbaijan following the downing of a passenger plane from the Azerbaijani airline AZAL by Russian Air Defense Systems and after the raid in Yekaterinburg, Russian security forces began to target Azerbaijanis more systematically. In early October 2025, another raid in Dagestan resulted in the expulsion of 19 people[33]. While relations between the two countries later stabilised, these incidents illustrate how easily violence against migrants can be exploited for various purposes—including recruiting new military personnel.
Migrants remain one of the several social groups the Russian authorities rely on to bolster the army without declaring a mobilisation. The methods used to recruit them into the regular army or contract service vary: these include incentives such as large payments and fast-tracked Russian citizenship, and forceful measures, such as compulsory service, threats of revocation of acquired citizenship, and deception in contract signing.
Those detained during raids are often intimidated and presented with a choice between deportation or signing a military contract, while migration legislation creates a legal framework that legitimises this violence. In September 2024, Caucasian Knot reported[34] that five Azerbaijani citizens were detained in Chechnya, tortured, and forced into signing military contracts. Public attention led to their release and return home, but such outcomes are rare. Detentions of foreign nationals often end with conscription and deployment to the front.
On May 15, 2023, amendments to the decree on simplified Russian citizenship for foreign nationals serving under a military contract came into effect[35]. Since 2022, the streamlined procedure has only been available for those who signed a one-year contract and either participated in combat for six months or were wounded. The new amendments removed these conditions: now, simply signing a contract with a duration of at least one year makes a person eligible for citizenship, and family members can also qualify.
A new citizenship law came into effect on October 26, 2023. It expanded the list of crimes that can lead to revocation of acquired citizenship, removing any statute of limitations. The law also added another ground for revoking citizenship—“actions that pose a threat to Russia’s national security”—and established procedures for cases involving “providing knowingly false information.” In practice, this gives authorities the power to revoke citizenship for criticising the government or any conduct they deem a “security threat.” Such vague language leaves security agencies wide discretion. The law directly violates the Constitution: under it, someone with acquired citizenship in Russia can never have the same rights as those born in the country.
As early as December 2023, two people were stripped of Russian citizenship for failing to register for military conscription records. The court held that by taking the citizenship oath and subsequently not registering for military duty, they had provided knowingly false information about themselves. The head of the local migration office believes the case is “a precedent for revoking Russian citizenship on such grounds.”[36]
Another tightening followed on August 8, 2024, as the deadline for newly naturalised citizens to report to the military enlistment office was reduced. Putin signed a law enabling the revocation of citizenship for failure to register for military conscription records within two weeks of its acquisition[37].
“Stoparmy Movement” also commented:
Naturalised citizens—those who have obtained Russian citizenship in recent years—are coming under increased pressure. New provisions allowing citizenship to be revoked for failure to register for military service effectively make their status conditional and create legal inequality between citizens ‘by birth’ and those ‘by acquisition.’ Overall, lawmaking in this area is less about regulating migration than about expanding surveillance mechanisms by tying it to internal security concerns. In November 2024, we learned of a case in which a native of Uzbekistan, who had received a Russian passport in 2023, was stripped of his citizenship after failing to register with the military authorities within the required timeframe[38]. This case became one of the first documented examples of citizenship being revoked for evasion of military obligations, demonstrating that the new provisions are not merely declarative. While such decisions remain rare, the very possibility of them creates a palpable sense of uncertainty among naturalised citizens: their status now directly depends on fulfilling military and other obligations to the state.
Migrants applying for Russian citizenship are often pressured into signing a military contract by officials at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Lawyers from “Peace Plea” report, based on the cases they handle:
Those seeking Russian citizenship are offered a fast-track procedure through contract military service. The terms and duration of service are often misrepresented, and in some migration centers, officials simply refuse to accept documents unless the applicant signs a consent form for the contract.
Police raids target new citizens who have not registered for military conscription records, using threats of losing their citizenship or deception to force them into signing contracts: they are promised positions in military construction or support roles behind the frontlines, without being told that the contract is open-ended. All these practices are unconstitutional and a clear example of state violence and arbitrary action by security forces.
“Peace Plea” reminds:
These raids are illegal. Police have no right to detain people en masse or send them to military enlistment offices for contract recruitment or registration. All Russian citizens have the same rights, regardless of when they received their passports. Everyone has the right to refuse military service, and men aged 18 to 30 can request a deferment, exemption, or alternative civilian service. Yet during forced registration, none of this is explained—instead, people are threatened with losing their citizenship, which the new laws now allow.
Valeria Vetoshkina agrees:
These amendments must be viewed in the context of ongoing military operations and the militarisation of legislation. Formally, these are ‘violations of a citizen’s duties,’ but in practice, these measures become tools of pressure and coercion to participate in the war. The state is establishing a model where loyalty is expressed not only in words but also in a willingness to serve. Stripping citizenship is one of the harshest sanctions, normally reserved for exceptional cases in democratic regimes, yet in Russia it has become a mechanism of mobilisation discipline. Expanding the grounds for losing citizenship undermines its very stability, turning people—especially naturalized citizens—into a vulnerable group expected not only to follow the law but also to demonstrate political or military loyalty.
One of our questions to experts from “Peace Plea” focused on how the new legislation has affected the number of appeals from foreign nationals who recently acquired Russian citizenship. The answer points to a clear rise in cases of coercion into military service:
We receive appeals where it is evident that the applicants have a migration background or are foreign nationals. However, when people contact us with a request for assistance on any issue and this context does not explicitly arise, we do not ask about their citizenship, country of origin, or legal status, which means the number of recorded requests may be significantly lower than the actual figure. In 2023, we received 16 such appeals; in 2024, that number rose to 115, with 102 of them coming between August and the end of the year. In 2025, up to November, there were 50 appeals. In other words, the main spike occurred in the first months following the introduction of the law on mandatory military registration.
Half of the requests for help received by “Peace Plea” from people with a migration background or foreign nationals relate to losing citizenship for failing to register for military service. Some applicants obtained Russian citizenship a long time ago and didn’t register, and now worry about whether they should. Others are going to register and seek advice on refusing mandatory military service and resisting recruitment. Often, individuals learn of the requirement to register through police.
About a quarter of those reaching out to “Peace Plea”—foreign nationals, migrants, or naturalised citizens—sought guidance on completing their military contract service. They come from across the globe, including Latin America, Europe, Africa, Central Asia, and China. Many don’t speak Russian at all and were misled about the terms of service.
Translated by Ekaterina Selenkina.