Abe Haddadi
I am currently living in Sweden. PhD in electrical engineering. Left Iran in 2018. Banned from entering Iran since the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement in 2022, because of activities on social media against the regime. In contact with the family of some political prisoners.
— Why did the bazaar merchants join, and what did it signal?
— At the beginning, the protests were mainly triggered by the runaway rise in the dollar exchange rate. Bazaar merchants were naturally among the first to feel the shock, because this kind of volatility directly destroys their ability to make decisions and plan.
One important point is that parts of the regime are actually fine with protests as long as the anger stays directed at the government, not at the whole system. This has been a familiar pattern, especially during reformist governments: the unelected institutions sometimes allow, even encourage, pressure “against the government.” That’s why, when protests started, figures from the Supreme Leader to the Speaker of Parliament and others gave verbal support at first.
But after a few days, when non-bazaar people joined, the demands widened and the slogans became more openly anti-regime.
I don’t think the bazaar people themselves knew it would reach this point. They basically lit a spark, and people who have been waiting for a chance to protest for years came out.
— What’s the link to “Woman, Life, Freedom” (2022)?
— Every protest wave builds on the ones before it. In Iran, the time between major protests is getting shorter. The same people who were active during the Jina (Mahsa) movement are now just three years older — more experienced, and clearer about what they want.
In 2022, society proved to itself that it’s willing to pay a price for basic human rights. Since then, under the surface, people have become more tolerant and more accepting of differences. Still, for part of society, bodily autonomy and “rights over the body” can feel like something “stylish,” something secondary.
But economic survival — livelihood, jobs, wages, basic stability — has always been there, and now it has reached an unbearable level. And that’s the most basic need everyone shares.
— How has solidarity across ethnic groups grown?
— The repression has been extremely intense, and in many cases it doesn’t even distinguish between provinces or ethnic groups. In the Green Movement of 2009, the protests were mostly urban. In 2017-2018, smaller towns entered the scene. In 2019-2020, it was both big cities and smaller cities. Ethnic issues sometimes appeared, but they weren’t the main story.
In the Jina (Mahsa) Amini movement, it seemed like ethnic groups came to the conclusion that they should emphasize their own rights too — especially Kurds and Baluchis. But once the repression became so brutal, people also reached a broader conclusion: we can’t stay separated. That’s one reason why this year, different groups felt more united. Every round of killings and crackdown has pushed people closer together and increased cooperation.
That said, I also feel a lot of this unity is driven by circumstances, and it’s possible that later we’ll see divisions reappear.
— Do protesters blame foreign actors or the regime?
— As far as I know, protesters mainly blame the regime. Even the sanctions are seen as a consequence of the regime’s unnecessary, reckless policies. After decades of sanctions and paying the price for nuclear and missile programs, they basically lost everything in those Referring to the "Twelve-day War" initiated by Israel in the summer of 2025.
— What has the near-total internet shutdown changed?
— As far as I know, some basic goods like cooking oil have become scarce. When the future is impossible to predict, planning becomes very hard. And without the internet, a huge part of online work and daily digital life simply collapses.
— Beyond open violence, what “softer” repression is used?
- Threatening SMS messages;
- Spreading rumors;
- Publishing phone numbers for people to report protesters to intelligence services;
- Calling families of activists abroad to threaten them;
- Calling people who were released from prison, to intimidate or control them;
- Attempts to hack personal accounts;
- State TV constantly pushes regime propaganda.
— How is this crackdown different from 2022?
- Use of military-grade weapons seems much wider;
- The repression forces look fully “free-handed,” acting with total discretion;
- Shooting wounded people with “finishing shots” has never been this widespread;
- Using pellet guns to blind people has increased a lot;
- Blocking or preventing medical treatment is something new at this scale.
— Who actually has influence on the ground?
— Monarchists are clearly more present in slogans, especially in central regions. This presence is smaller among Kurds, Baluchis, and Arabs — but at the same time, you don’t really hear strong ethnic slogans there either. The dominant voice is still freedom.
Secular democrats are not “slogan-makers,” so they’re less visible in street language. Inside Iran, there’s also a deep and widespread disgust toward the MEK (Mujahedin-e Khalq).
The loud voices you hear from far-left groups, radical feminists, and the MEK are much more visible outside Iran than inside.
— Leaderless movement: strength or weakness?
— This time, because of calls by Mr. Pahlavi and Kurdish parties, turnout in the streets was broader. But the internet shutdown and the intensity of repression make any real leadership impossible — especially leadership that could sustain street control and keep people in the streets.
In this situation, “leadership” is basically reduced to statements and calls — not tactics for actually holding ground, organizing, and “taking the streets.”
— Why is it so hard to create a unified coalition?
— I think it’s mostly because of the deep wounds these groups have inflicted on each other—old wounds that have aged. Many feel they don’t need the others. At the same time, they see the regime’s repression as so powerful that they assume any coalition is doomed anyway.
They talk about unity in general terms, but they rarely recognize each other’s real weight and role.
Another issue is our historical understanding of democracy: many still reduce it to majority rule only. Whenever a group feels it has the majority, it ignores everyone else—and then later loses that majority. We still haven’t learned that minority rights are what actually protect democracy.
And on top of that, the Islamic Republic fuels distrust through infiltration, manipulation, and rumor campaigns.
— What does underground cultural resistance look like now?
— People have built a life that is basically independent from the regime’s values. What they watch, like, wear, and consume is often directly against the Islamic Republic’s Shi’a ideology.
And as always, jokes and humor are one of the most effective tools of everyday resistance.
— Realistic scenarios for the next 1–3 years?
— Scenario 1 (external conflict): a U.S. attack, Iran getting dragged deeper into conflict with Israel, and a wider war that leads to the fall of the Islamic Republic—maybe within about six months. In that case, there could be some form of U.S. presence to guarantee the transition. After that, it could go toward either a constitutional monarchy or a republic.
Scenario 2 (internal/military): a continued shadow of threat and pressure until a military coup happens, removing destabilizing institutions like the Supreme Leader, and writing a new constitution. Either the military hands power over later, or it stays.
After the Islamic Republic, it looks like public opinion may lean toward a strong central authority.
— How different is the diaspora from inside Iran?
— The diversity among the diaspora is not less than inside Iran. But I don’t think diaspora opinions are decisive, because most of them probably won’t move back even if the regime falls.
— Are international media biased or unreliable?
— With internet cutoffs and limited inside communication, it’s genuinely hard to get accurate information. I think when it comes to facts, media reporting is often reasonably accurate. But on analysis, it still feels like many outsiders can’t truly grasp the inside reality of Iran.
— What should the international community do differently?
— Governments act too slowly in pressuring the regime. When a military or security force carries out killings on this scale, there shouldn’t be hesitation in designating it as a terrorist entity.
A lot of regime relatives and connected people live abroad, and their presence creates intimidation for others. Large amounts of money leave Iran, and foreign governments don’t seriously stop it.
The one thing the outside world doesn’t understand is that the Islamic Republic, to survive, is capable of committing violence on a scale far beyond this—even a hundred times worse. Iranians understand this, but many non-Iranians still think it’s unlikely or exaggerated.
— What is it like to live in a religious family, especially when you do not consider religion a part of your life? How did you cope, and did you rebel as a teenager? Are there any special family traditions you miss while being outside of Iran?
— I was actually religious myself until around the age of 21, so I didn’t really rebel as a teenager. Over time, by watching how my family members interpreted the world through religion, I gradually began to make my own choices. Stopping the external practices—praying, fasting, religious rituals—was the easy part. The harder part was learning how to genuinely open myself to a different way of thinking and living.
Religion can sometimes function as a kind of protective simplicity: you don’t question too much, and many answers are already given to you. Letting go of that was difficult, but it has also been an interesting and adventurous journey. It meant learning how to think independently, to tolerate uncertainty, and to build my own values rather than inherit them.
As for nostalgia, I don’t particularly miss religious traditions. We were a large family, and most gatherings were big, loud, and chaotic—and that’s mainly what I remember.
What I do miss isn’t a tradition, really. I miss being a child. I remember once trying to put a fallen sparrow chick back into its nest. That feeling—that sense of innocence and care—is what I miss the most.
Sosseh Ratos
I'm an Armenian Iranian, almost 30 years old, from Tehran. My main occupation is teaching and translation. I have a very active family in the Armenian and Iranian political sphere. My father was a community doctor and a prominent political activist in Iran. Later on, I also started activist activity with him. My background is mostly in Armenian affairs, but since recently I have become more active for my Iranian people as well.
— These protests began with shopkeepers in Tehran's Grand Bazaar on December 28, 2025. Why did this traditionally conservative merchant class finally snap? What does their participation signal?
— In my opinion, it was because of the huge inflation and massive drop in the value of the rial. Conservative merchants from the Bazaar (the heart of Iranian domestic economy) would usually stay silent during the past protests, especially the political ones, as they were still able to continue their business despite the sanctions. They’d find a loophole to make money and stay afloat. If they ever went on strike, it would be in support of the people, that would be it. But this time, even they couldn’t continue living their lives and doing their job as usual. Nobody could afford buying food or paying rent.
— How do the 2026 protests specifically connect to the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement that began in 2022? How do you see the intersection of gender oppression with ethnic and class oppression in the current struggle?
— As I said the merchants were the first to start protesting in Iran. People joined them on day 2 or 3 as far as I recall. They joined, first due to the economic hardships, but then it soon turned political. I think there are two reasons.
Firstly, people in Iran strongly believe that if the Bazaris strike or join the protests, the regime will fall. That’s because during the 1979 revolution, when the merchants went on strike, it helped the revolution move faster. So this time, they gained hope and joined in massive numbers.
Secondly, some news came out (which was soon confirmed) that the bodies of protesters from the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement were discovered at the Karaj dam in Karaj city near Tehran. That fueled everyone’s anger and reminded them of the killings of 2022 (which included teenage girls). Also, women were rebelling against the regime by refusing to wear their headscarves for more than a year, so the general atmosphere was already tense, and women’s resistance was a huge part of it. So as soon as it became political, everyone joined.
As you said, because it was mostly economic pressure on people, they didn’t really care about anyone’s ethnicity and realized that Jina (Mahsa) Amini was just a Kurdish girl (from one of many minorities) that was wrongfully killed just for being a woman and not covering herself up exactly as prescribed. She didn’t need to die and still no one accepts it. Also, in a poor economy, nobody cares about any ethnic or gender-based conflict, they just want to stay alive and do not want their children to die for some ideology they don’t align with. These thoughts and general agreements united them further.
— How has the movement fostered solidarity across ethnic lines (Persian, Kurdish, Baluch, Azeri, etc.) in the face of a regime that tries to divide them? Given the severe economic war and sanctions, to what extent do protesters blame external forces versus internal mismanagement and corruption for their plight?
— I think I already discussed the severe economic problems there and how it united them. One thing I can add is that, weirdly enough, nobody blames the West or the USA for the sanctions at all. They actually agree with them. They believe that, with the help of sanctions, the regime might get weaker to the point it can be overthrown. They mostly blame the regime for domestic mismanagement and poor handling of foreign affairs, which forced the West to sanction further. Of course, through heavy propaganda against every and any ethnic groups in Iran, they slightly changed the narrative between different ethnic groups into one of racism and hatred.
One thing they couldn’t change though, was their nationalism. Iranians are more nationalistic than they are religious. Some small cities might be more devout, but they are also proud to be part of the country. I think you could also notice this phenomenon in the 12-day war with Israel. I also feel like this is the first time that everyone thinks the same and everyone is united, because they realized that no matter who you are, what gender you are, how religious you are or which ethnic group you belong to, the government doesn’t care about you—they’ll starve you, kill you, only to reach whatever goals they have.
— We see extreme violence, internet blackouts, and mass arrests. How has the near-total internet shutdown since Jan. 8, 2026 affected people's ability to work, access basic services, or find scarce goods?
— From my sources (former co-workers, family members, friends, etc.) I heard that going to work is almost impossible sometimes. There are military guards everywhere patrolling every part of the city, carrying out arbitrary arrests and beatings. They also check their phones, their cars, and threaten them. They also use loudspeakers to propagate regime propaganda and threatening warnings for the people to hear, so going out and going to work is very hard and dangerous.
In my city, Tehran, there is a curfew. My brother said that they are not allowed to go out after 6 PM and landline calls are completely blocked in city centers. In other parts of Tehran, they have a limited amount of time to make calls. After 6 PM, the lines are cut completely.
When it comes to food, it is extremely expensive. My family can’t afford chicken or eggs. My friend has a two-year-old son and she struggles to find certain basic items like chicken or milk to feed her child. She said that they make rice and stews made of whatever items they could find. She said her workplace is near an important square and it is heavily guarded so she is scared of walking there because there are still police shootings happening there. Most banks don’t work. Only one national bank works but for limited hours during the day. Certain medications are hard to find also.
— Beyond the obvious brutality, what are the more subtle or systemic methods of repression and social control being employed by the state to crush dissent and sow fear today?
— They try to scare people by arresting some people that they suspect might be a rebel or a family member of a martyr from the recent protests. They also try to take away any device that might help people to access the internet. My friend hides her Starlink dish as much as possible so that the regime won’t take it away. I have a political activist friend that lost his eyes in the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement. He lost family members in these mass killings that happened recently. He says that his neighbours were questioned by the police regarding the whereabouts of protesters. Furthermore, they constantly send text messages to threaten people and demand them to divulge information about anyone that they know participated in the protests. They also said on national TV, that if children get shot and killed, it’s not their fault, but rather the parents’ fault for letting them out of the house or sending them to protests.
— The UN reports a severity of killings “unprecedented” in Iran's protest history. What is different about the state's tactics and weaponry in this crackdown compared to 2022?
— They used the same tactic of shutting down the internet, but this time they also cut the landlines. They also cut the electricity in many cities (this has never happened before) to kill everyone in darkness. In fact, while they were preparing to suppress this protest, a considerable number of army personnel quit their positions, and started sending messages to different groups on social media that they quit or were planning to quit (I was in 3 of those groups with up to 30k members,all from Iran). In most videos people covered their faces but wore a uniform and sent text/voice messages clearly stating that they are not going to obey the system anymore.
I think that was the reason that the regime imported militias from Iraq and started brutally killing people without mercy. I knew this as a fact before CNN reported on it because my friend mentioned a weird incident—he said that he went out to buy cigarettes, and as he was passing the street he heard some people dressed in black talking in Arabic (in smaller cities people talk in their mother tongue but in big cities they all use Persian as it’s easier to converse, so this is odd). Then some videos and testimonies started to flood the news channels about the same thing. They heard some people talking Arabic, or when they were being shot while protesting, the guards would be shouting in Arabic. This never happened during the 2022 movement. They never hired mercenaries from outside the country, only the IRGC would try to suppress or beat, but they never came out of their military bases with the intent of killing, although killings would still happen when protests got out of hand.
Another thing that is different this time is the crackdown on satellite dishes. The last time this happened was in 2009. I remember back then the police coming to our house and forcefully taking our satellite dish. As a child, I was scared, and for months we didn’t have TV. This time they are more guarded, more organized and more brutal. They never guarded the city this intensely.
I may add another point: as a Christian minority I can tell you that this is the first time that my community is scared. My community has told me that they were warned not to speak nor name the people that got killed in this revolution, or else... My friend begged me not to say a word about any martyrs that we had, because the community is under heavy pressure and something bad will happen if any of us speak out. It took us 4 days to know that some of us were killed. This never happened in 2022!
— Can you map the opposition landscape? Which factions (monarchists, ethnic groups, secular democrats, The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), also known as Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) is an exiled Iranian opposition organization.) have actual influence on the ground, and which only have a voice abroad?
— I think there is one very influential movement, whose nature is nationalistic and also somewhat monarchist. You can’t put an exact name on it, because you may find left-wing, right-wing, or neutral people within it. Almost everyone in this massive political group thinks that Prince Reza Pahlavi is on of the main figures of Iranian opposition, currently in exile in the United States. A member of the Pahlavi dynasty and the eldest son of the last shah of Iran, he was officially named a crowned prince of Iran prior to the Iranian Revolution of 1979. is a good choice to be the face of the movement and the next step for a better future. Now we also have ardent monarchists, who basically worship this man. If you criticize the Pahlavi dynasty, you are seen as a traitor, unfortunately they are quite influential these days.
Secular democrats have a voice abroad, but not within the country, at least not as a political party. Don’t get it wrong, the idea of a democracy is something that everyone agrees with in Iran, and they are trying to achieve it, but they usually don’t like representatives from outside of Iran. MEK is highly frowned upon. People view them as a cult or a terrorist group, both inside and outside of Iran, due to some of their extremist views. They have a scant following in Iran. Currently, the ethnic groups in Iran are united and are working towards the revolution, so there isn’t much tension between them right now. Most ethnic groups are following the first group that I have mentioned above. That keeps them united and focused.
— The movement seems to be decentralized and leaderless. From your perspective, is this a strength or a vulnerability in the face of state repression? How does coordination and tactical knowledge spread without a central command?
— At first the movement was leaderless. 100%. But soon enough as they chanted some slogans like “Long live the Shah” (in reference to both Reza Pahlavi and his father, Mohamad Reza Pahlavi), Prince Reza Pahlavi started his campaign and used this opportunity to offer his leadership, which was almost unanimously agreed upon in Iran. The slogans are pretty clear: “Pahlavi will come back”, “Rest in peace Pahlavi”, “Shah , Reza Pahlavi”, “Go away Khamenei, Pahlavi is coming”.
In my opinion, Reza Pahlavi is a symbol of this revolution, the people of Iran don’t necessarily want a monarchy to come back, they simply use his name and his influence to overthrow this regime, because this regime was established by getting rid of the last dynasty. So in a way they chant and support Pahlavi right now as a form of moral revenge on the regime. I wouldn’t say this movement is leaderless now, I think this man is influential in his country, but outside of it, in the eyes of the West or the USA, he is just another form of opposition to the regime—they are not impressed by him and that’s an issue for Iranians.
This makes the movement somewhat vulnerable from the outside. His ineffectiveness can lead other countries to do nothing but put more sanctions, which won’t help this revolution, it will only starve them more. People in Iran are waiting for some sort of foreign intervention, so they can have time to breathe and start the protests again. I know it sounds like that contradicts the purpose, but I would not say that is the case, as they think that if regime bases come under attack, the government will panic and start defending themselves by leaving some parts of the cities unguarded, giving space for the people to come out again.
They are very much ready, that’s for sure. They are even angrier than before because they have lost their family members. Now how are they making each other aware of the next move? Well for now, it is almost impossible to start another protest, so what they do is contact different Iranian news channels outside Iran, and tell each other about the situation in the cities and give each other courage. During the protests and the blackout, they used horns to remind people to come out (my friend said she saw some men on motorbikes going around and shouting in the streets: “Come out people, it’s time”, so that everyone would go out). Another source was watching some Iranian news channels, and listening to Reza Pahlavi for the next move.
— What are the specific, practical barriers preventing a unified opposition coalition? Is it ideology, personality, security, or regime manipulation?
— Ideology mostly, followed by regime manipulation. The opposition parties don’t try to present a better alternative or leader, or anything really. They usually try to educate people (I’m talking about leftist groups or secular democrats) or criticize some interviews or anything they find unacceptable. And unfortunately people hardly ever listen to them now. I can understand that. They are frustrated and are being starved. Most say, “How about we argue about this later, when we have a free Iran and everyone can present their parties or ideologies?” Well, since we have lost so many people during the past weeks, all the political groups outside of Iran started blaming each other, creating a rift within the diaspora. This doesn’t help because the regime uses this chance to manipulate them further by conducting cyber attacks or controlling the narrative on the global stage by sending out videos of the dead to the outside with a clear view of every single corpse lying on the ground—the regime stokes fear and further disappointment among different groups outside of Iran.
— Describe the clandestine cultural resistance (the music, art, graffiti, and memes, etc.) that fuels morale. How does it circulate now?
— This is what I have seen in the media and heard from my family—they usually spray paint on the walls in every street they may go. A friend of mine made templates of the Pahlavi Iranian flag and started to spray paint with his friends. Artists outside of Iran make new songs and send them to our news channels to be shown and demonstrated for courage and motivation. Some sang before the protests and made a video to broadcast in social media groups to encourage everyone to come out. Many of us make memes of the regime’s ineptitude and post them online on Reddit and Instagram. Iranians are very funny actually; even in their slogans there are many funny references to Iranian dishes whose names rhyme with the names of different figures in the regime. So in that way they make fun of them. All this art and music is being shown on our satellite channels, that’s why the regime tries to stop people from purchasing or owning satellite dishes.
— What are the realistic scenarios for the next 1-3 years?
— It’s a little bit hard to tell. But this time the regime is going to fall. Sooner or later, it’s going to fall. But it all depends on the people and the resistance and foreign intervention. People are unarmed, fighting against a regime that kills them with machine guns. They need help and support, so a foreign intervention is necessary. If no one helps, this revolution is going to drag on longer, and more blood will be spilled.
— There are Iranian diasporas in many countries. How do the opinions and political views of certain diasporas differ from those of Iranians inside the country? Or in the opposite, one can say that this factor is not as important as others (eg. class, political views, age)?
— Both opinions can be true at the same time. Although Iranians are very much united right now, the views of the diaspora and the people inside Iran differ regarding the revolution. I think the diaspora sees it as an ideological thing—an opportunity to fix the bad decisions of the past, whereas the people in Iran see this as their last hope and opportunity. That’s why when the mass killings happened, the diaspora fell into despair, but the people of Iran stayed strong and continued to fight in whatever way possible. Another point is that the new generation is unique in their mindset. They don’t know much about the 1979 revolution, nor do they care about the monarchy. So the past doesn’t haunt them like it does their middle-aged family members. Nor are they obligated to follow strict religious codes like the religious class. They are not burnt out by the constant unrest and killings that happened when the millennials were around. They are more informed and organized thanks to social media, and they are unapologetically themselves. They demand their freedom and they led the last two protest movements (e.g. “Woman, Life, Freedom”). There were many young women and teenagers among the dead. And when the older generations witness their bravery, they support and join them. Just look at our new martyrs in this revolution. They are mostly people from 15 to 30 years old, and among them are their parents and grandparents. This movement unified every class and age and generation, and that is a beautiful thing.
— International media seem to be very biased when it comes to covering the situation in Iran, can you comment on it? Which outlets can be trusted, if any?
— I think there is biased or poor coverage because they are ill informed about the political complexities of Iran. They may think that this is just another Islamic country in the Middle East, having the 100th problem in a year or they just don’t understand Iranians and their cry for help, by using Western labels which don't fit the situation at all. For example, they call them “Zionist” or “Israel supporters”. That’s not true. Iranians may be one of the few people in the Middle East that have never had an issue with their Jewish communities, and they have strong, friendly ties with them. Now is propaganda exaggerating everything? Yes. But this propaganda wouldn’t just brainwash 90 million people’s minds. I think instead of judging a whole country and doing lazy journalistic work, they need to research more and ask Iranians the same questions that they ask from out-of-touch middle-aged political analysts. There are also some other outlets that twist or underreport the situation in Iran deliberately in order to appease a certain political agenda, and that is apparent and hurtful. They knowingly paint a wrong picture of Iran and its brutal regime to gain some likes or some claps from certain unaware people from the West. This not only shows their inability to do their job professionally, but also creates a dangerous narrative around this movement that hurts many people and puts lives in danger.
I don’t follow a particular media outlet right now. I follow and watch almost anything I can find. This is sadly the truth for Iranians these days, because of these internet blackouts we are desperate to hear or read anything that comes out about Iran. I can recommend Iran International though. I don’t fully endorse this channel, but because they receive the news from Iran faster and Reza Pahlavi has some interviews or calls to action from this platform, you can watch and guess the next move in this uprising. Don’t watch Fox News😊.
— What, concretely, should the international community (governments, NGOs, media) be doing that it currently is not? What forms of solidarity from abroad are most effective, and what well-intentioned actions are actually counterproductive?
— I usually think that foreign interventions can be counterproductive, but in this case I’d contradict myself. We have lost almost 20.000[1]. The regime slaughtered unarmed civilians just because they wanted their freedom back. When there is a mass killing happening, I think foreign intervention is necessary. If this doesn’t happen, more people will be killed or executed. Another thing, perhaps the most important, is that Iranians need internet access. The NGOs, if they want to help us, must help us to fundraise and acquire Starlink dishes. We need to work more on raising awareness about the people of Iran with the help of activists and humanitarian organizations so we can put pressure on governments. And when it comes to political organizations or governments, I think they are very short-sighted. They cannot grasp this idea, that a free Iran means a freer world. They need to abandon or update their rusty political tactics that stopped working years ago, and adapt a fresh approach to the Middle East, without giving false promises or trying to negotiate with the regime. You can’t negotiate with a killer.
If no one does anything other than meaninglessly tweeting on our behalf, this is going to turn out to be another disaster like Syria or Libya—either cut out from the world for some time or a breeding ground for Islamist militias. And when it explodes, it will be another unstable country. This is what I fear.
— What is the single most important thing the outside world fails to understand about this moment in Iran?
— That the people of Iran are fighting not only for their freedom but for the freedom and the stability of the region. That they are not terrorists or any other labels that some far-left or far-right activists attach to us. We are horribly misunderstood. Everything that people listen or read about Iran is filtered through the regime's propaganda. So instead of blindly following the waves of misinformation, I invite them to engage with Iranian natives more and listen to their plea. I’ll quote a Palestinian author that I read days ago: “a dictator that kills his own people, will never free another suppressed people” . I agree with her and I call out anyone that says otherwise.
— As an Iranian-Armenian, how would you describe the community's traditional stance toward political protest in Iran? Given the government's sensitivity to “foreign interference” , do you sense increased caution or surveillance against minorities now?
— Definitely. As I mentioned in one of my answers, they have already started to impose some direct and indirect pressure on the Armenian community to pretend as though everything is normal. But this is a lie. They are patrolling the Armenian areas in my city too, and warned the Armenians not to say a single word or name any of our Armenian martyrs in this revolution. My friends and family are cautious and scared. And the Armenian church tries to stay neutral. However, we still lost 12 people in this uprising which means that the community does try to stand alongside their fellow Iranian people.
The Armenian community has always been the cultural and architectural hub in Iran. They were also prominent merchants in Iran throughout history. But when it came to politics they were very often neutral or had few people involved in politics. Despite this, there were many times when the Armenians supported Iran and stood beside the people and fought alongside them. For example during the Iran-Iraq War, we had many Armenian martyrs that participated in defending the country. And as you know, this time also, they tried to ignore the warnings and join the protests. I’m honestly very proud of them.
— There have been significant protests by Iranians at the Iranian Embassy in Yerevan, Armenia. As someone connected to both nations, what goes through your heart and mind when you see videos of Iranians protesting in the streets of Yerevan?
— I only feel pain and sorrow that I have been going through this for the second time and this time for Iran. I’ve been to many protests as an Armenian. I have seen injustice and I felt this hopelessness again and again. I feel like now I carry a double pain. I have lost my Armenian friend due to constant wars and now I'm losing my Iranian friends. This is horrible. It’s like deja-vu… Armenians understand their Iranian friends and realize that these protests and demonstrations are necessary. They don’t agree with the government limiting their time or place to protest. So recently the Armenians on social media or even in the protests themselves started to show their solidarity and defended the protests. I also support their protectiveness over the Iranian community here. I want them to feel safe in Armenia and to know that we love and support them no matter what.