Belarus is often portrayed as an extension of Russia. People speak Russian here, eat similar foods, and watch similar movies in the cinema. They read Russian books and keep track of what’s happening in Russia. This state of affairs has developed due to two centuries of expansion and the import of Russian culture, language, legislation, and social structure. This was accompanied by interference in Belarus’s economic and political life, mass shootings, exiles, politically motivated killings, and pressure on the Belarusian intelligentsia and culture.
The authors highlight the contradictions in Russia’s colonial policy towards Belarus, which was left out as a buffer zone. Its culture and ethnic diversity were simplified and limited to Russian-Orthodox narratives. The authors also examine why decolonization efforts by Belarusians meet resistance not only from neighboring countries but also from their own authorities.
The Russian Empire strikes (back) permanently
Some examples of the aggressive expansion of the Russian Empire are described by Russian researchers of history, geography, and ethnography. For instance, in his multi-volume work “Picturesque Russia,” which was edited by the Russian geographer Pyotr Semenov (Tyan-Shansky), Adam Kirkor mentions in the section on “Belarusian Polesie” that during the Thirteen Years’ War in 1654, the troops of the Russian tsar Alexei Mikhailovich laid siege to Mogilev. The inhabitants surrendered, demanding confirmation of the same rights and privileges that the city enjoyed in the . The Russian tsar signed documents on preserving privileges, but his troops, who occupied the city after that, “raged, plundered, offended the inhabitants in every possible way”—until the residents of Mogilev rebelled against them in 1661. During his reign, Russian troops partially evicted and brutally murdered Mogilev Jews “without distinction of gender and age”. And during the Northern War of 1700-1712, by order of Peter I, Mogilev, as well as another major regional center, Vitebsk, were completely burned down so that the Swedish army could not use them as strongholds.
The colonization itself—specifically the establishment of political and religious control, extraction of natural, cultural, and human resources, and erasure of local cultural, political, and social practices—began with the annexation of Belarusian lands by the Russian Empire during the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772, 1793, and 1795. Culturally, it was followed by forced Russification, which intensified after the 1830-1831 liberation uprising organized by the Polish and Belarusian-Lithuanian nobility. The University of Vilnius and many schools were closed, record-keeping and education were transferred to the Russian language, Russian authorities began to introduce Russian-language toponyms and the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) were called the Western Provinces. The authentic architecture of cities was destroyed, and objects of art and luxury were exported to Russia.
The ideology of the “Russian world” justifies the current Russian expansion; the history of the Russian Empire is now being understood from this perspective, and the idea of the unifying factor of the Orthodox faith occupies an important place in this ideology. However, at the time of the partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, only 39% of the inhabitants of the annexed territories were Greek Catholics, 38% were Catholics, and only 6% were Orthodox.
The Uniate Church emerged in the GDL as a result of the Union of Brest in 1596, which proclaimed the unity of the Kyiv Metropolitanate and the Roman Church. Russian historians (M. Koyalovich and his followers) and Soviet historians (Y.N. Marash, V.A. Matskevich, K.E. Dmitruk) often evaluate this event as an example of “”. However, some Belarusian researchers (S. Morozova, V.M. Konon, S.A. Podokshin) believe that the GDL took the step towards the union of the two churches precisely to protect its internal interests from both Western and Russian expansionist interests. For example, Morozova, in her doctoral dissertation on the Uniate Church, considers the union to be “closely linked to the problem of defending the church and state sovereignty of the GDL” (transl. From Belarusian).
Historian of the confessional history of Belarus and the GDL, Elena Filatova, reveals that the policy of the Russian Empire towards Belarusian confessions was initially inconsistent. However, starting from the mid-18th century, the focus shifted towards establishing the dominance of the Orthodox Church. By the beginning of the 19th century, the policy was aimed at eliminating the Uniate Church. Conversions to Orthodoxy were also stimulated by payments of rewards and demands to convert children from interfaith marriages involving Orthodox believers. Jewish children were forcibly converted to Christianity without the consent of their parents, and parents who exposed children of mixed marriages to Christian rites other than Orthodox could be imprisoned. Filatova believes that for many rural residents, the issue of changing their confession within Christianity was not fundamental: they could switch from Uniate to Orthodox, then return to Uniate, and then turn to Catholicism, continuing to attend the same village church with the same clergy. Finally, after all the intermediate measures, in 1839, the Union of Brest was abolished at the Synod of Polotsk under the banner of “reunification with the Orthodox Church.”
During this time, the myth of “Western Russian” lands, ethnicity, and language began to shape. Curiously, Russian sources frequently refer to their relations with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and its annexed territories as “Russo-Polish,” employing terms such as the “Russo-Polish War,” “the partitions of Poland,” the “Polish question,” and “Polish uprisings.” However, it is worth noting that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was a federation of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The territories of Belarus and Ukraine not only encompassed a significant portion of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania but also frequently served as the primary sites for the corresponding historical events.
This blending can be attributed to the unique ways in which Belarusians identified themselves. Some based their identity on a place of birth: those from the Minsk, Grodno, and Vilnius regions considered themselves Lithuanian, while those from the Vitebsk and Mogilev regions identified as Belarusian. Others identified themselves based on religion: those who followed Catholicism or Uniatism were called Poles, while those who followed Orthodoxy were called Russians. The nobility identified as Poles, and this self-identification was further reinforced in response to Russian aggression. The majority of rural population referred to themselves as “тутэйшымі” (“local”) or identified with their regional identity. In any case, the self-identification of Belarusians at that time contradicted the notion that they were one people with Russians and viewed their land as “Western Russia.”
Mikhail Koyalovich, a Slavophile subjectivist and one of the leading theorists of “West Russianism,” believed that Lithuanians had a specific role to play in protecting Rus from Prussian and Livonian knights by being a “guard regiment of the Russians.” This role was demonstrated during the Napoleonic War of 1812. While some of the nobility supported Napoleon, hoping to restore the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, part of the peasant population engaged in partisan attacks on landlords. However, the armies of both empires had the most significant—and devastating—effect on the state of Belarus. During the movement of French and Russian troops, locals were exhausted by the collection or destruction of provisions and valuables, which were to prevent their capture by the enemy. The hostilities resulted in the destruction of many settlements and infrastructure, with a significant number of such incidents unfolding precisely on the territory of Belarus.
During the same period, the hardship and turmoil experienced by Belarusians under the new regime until 1830-1831 were mainly due to the exploitation of their lands and physical labor rather than targeted repression. In contrast, Jews faced them almost immediately: fearing competition from Jewish merchants with Muscovites and also instituting a registration system in new territories, the Russian authorities established the “Pale of Settlement.” Jews were only permitted to live in Belarus and the Novorossiysk region (Northern Black Sea coast) and were required to register and settle in specific locations, later only in cities. For many, this meant losing their previous sources of income and facing significant restrictions on finding new ones.
Although the colonial policy is often presented as a means of bringing progress to colonized territories, it actually had the opposite effect. It is worth noting that when Belarusian urban residents became part of the Russian Empire, they lost their tax privileges, and their cities lost the protections of Magdeburg Law. As a result, these measures hindered industrial development, and urban production remained largely manual and artisanal, while horticulture thrived within city limits. The government was primarily interested in using cities as centers for the Russification of Belarusian-Lithuanian territories, and different ethnic and religious groups were often set against each other. This approach to governance was at odds with imperial interests and undermined the consolidation of populations within cities, especially within the “gubernias.”
Amidst a slowdown in industrial development, Belarus turned towards specializing in agriculture, which resulted in the country’s increased economic dependence in the long run and affected the social status of Belarusians in both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Valentin Golubev, one of the most prominent Belarusian historians of our time and a co-author of the 1994 Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, highlights in his scholarly works, speeches, and interviews the issues surrounding the Russian and Soviet historiography of Belarus during the time of the GDL. During the Soviet era, the GDL was not studied as a state formation, let alone in the context of Belarusian statehood. Other specific problems were also present: regional sources were underused, errors from early Russian works were replicated, and the Russian conceptual apparatus was used, which does not correspond to the Belarusian context. For instance, in the description of rural communities, Russian terminology was employed. Moreover, as Golubev notes, “It was a rule among historians to insert something about how bad things were in Belarus and how it lagged behind its eastern neighbor in political and economic development.” At the same time, during the 15th and 16th centuries, the GDL was part of the pan-European market and thrived economically as a state.
It should be noted that agriculture in Belarus experienced growth after joining Russia, thanks to the expansion of the export market and the implementation of crop rotation. However, this progress came at the expense of the peasants, who suffered from increased serfdom and exploitation. During the allocation of estates to Russian landlords and officials, former state peasants became their property, resulting in the loss of their rights. As a result, the number of “state” peasants declined sharply, and many of them were also subjected to rent exploitation, pushing them into a state of serfdom. Unlike in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, where the army was professional, peasants were forcibly recruited in Russia.
The demographic impact of the increasing oppression and consequences of the 1812 war was significant. Between 1838 and 1850, natural population growth in the “western provinces” was the lowest in the European territory of the Russian Empire. In the GDL, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the Russian Empire, economic growth led primarily to an increase in the wealth and income of privileged classes through intensified exploitation of peasants and hired laborers. However, in the first two cases, the economy developed in the interest of their own Belarusian statehood. Culturally, Belarus was also part of the Renaissance: with developments in humanistic approaches, science, education, and art.
Following Belarus’s annexation by the Russian Empire, Belarusians attempted numerous times to establish liberation movements and rebel against social and national oppression, only to be consistently suppressed and met with waves of repression. Perhaps the most well-known attempt was the uprising led by Kastus Kalinowski (Kastuś Kalinoŭski) between 1863 and 1864, which sought not only to liberate Belarus from Russian rule but also to achieve self-governance. Kalinowski orchestrated the rebellion with the help of the underground newspaper “Muzhytskaya Pravda” (The Peasant Truth), the first Belarusian-language publication, which was distributed among the peasants, the most populous class in Belarus. The peasants’ position and mood had been exacerbated by the predatory 1861 reform, which de jure abolished serfdom but de facto transformed them into a new, dependent class of wage laborers by “liberating” them from the land.
The number of rebels in Lithuania and Belarus is estimated to be at least 15,000 people, of whom at least 15,000 were prosecuted by the Russian authorities. The majority were placed under police surveillance, several thousand were exiled, and 123 individuals, including Kalinowski himself, were either shot or hanged.
Today, Kalinowski is primarily viewed as a national hero. Historian Alexei Kavka connects the slogan “Жыве Беларусь!” (“Long live Belarus!”) to the password phrase allegedly used by the insurgents: “Каго любіш?—Люблю Беларусь—То ўзаемна” (“Whom do you love—I love Belarus—Then we love each other.”) The quote from Kalinowski’s final letter, “Бо я табе з-пад шeбеніцы кажу, Народзе, што тагды толькі зажывеш шчасліва, калі над табою Маскаля ўжэ не будзе” (“For I tell you, People, from under the gallows, that you will only live happily when the Moskals are no longer over you,”) is often cited by modern nationalists. Such a viewpoint is also supported by contemporary Russian propaganda (which may have opposing goals): for instance, in early 2021, the official account of the Russian embassy published a post discrediting Kalinowski and referring to the insurgent groups as “gangs” involved in “mass killings of civilians”—issuing this publication to express their concerns about the nationalist component of the Belarusian protest movement, which became active after the 2020 elections. However, it is essential to note another perspective: Kalinowski was essentially a socialist democrat rather than a champion of a national idea. It is possible, though, that the Belarusians could be led towards alternative paths of self-determination if the uprising or socialist revolution is successful and there are changes in their material and social living conditions.
The political reaction of the Russian authorities towards Belarus after the 1863 uprising was also manifested in “management based on the laws of military rule, not extending a number of bourgeois reforms of the 1860s to its territory”—in particular, the judicial and zemstvo reforms, which had a rather positive impact in Russia.
Nation and class
Towards the end of the 19th century, Belarus had a predominantly peasant population, who made up 76% of the population according to the 1897 census. These peasants were also the primary driving force behind the resistance during the post-reform period, carrying out hundreds of protests between 1862 and 1900, including direct actions against landowners and land seizures, and evading predatory “redemption” payments imposed during the liberation from serfdom. “Гісторыя сялянства Беларусі” (“The History of the Peasantry of Belarus”) offers a detailed account of the growing class antagonism during that period. However, the study also notes another aspect of the political views of the Belarusians of that time: along with their hatred towards landlords, they harbored an illusion about a good tsar who would protect them from the latter. These views were actively promoted by the imperial power itself, including through the Orthodox Church and through the ideologization of the Kalinowski uprising as the uprising of “enlightened landlords.” A parallel can be drawn with modern propaganda: authoritarian figures weaken the protest potential and ties within society and maintain a rigid vertical power structure by assuming the role of defenders of the oppressed from the treacherous West.
In the cities, Jews comprised almost half the population, with Russians coming in second place at around 20%, while the peasants were mostly ethnic Belarusians. The “Russian bureaucracy and intelligentsia” concentrated in the cities promoted the cultural Russification of the inhabitants of Belarus. They controlled schools, printed publications, and libraries while ridiculing everything Belarusian and calling the language “peasant.” According to historian Z. Shibeko, “the joining of the Belarusian masses to Russian culture in the absence of their own state and distinctive religion had the effect of denationalization.” The authors of the text critically perceive the European idea of the nation and the longing of the right-wing for their own cultural and bourgeois elites, to whom they assign a leading role in nation-building. At the same time, it is noted that the concentration of cultural levers, including in the hands of Russians, worsened the situation for all other inhabitants of Belarus, depriving them of the right to their own ethnic identity and pride.
During the early 20th century and Soviet era, Belarus, Belarusians, and other ethnic groups were subject to colonial strategies and practices requiring another text to describe. It’s important to note that at this time, Belarus remained a bargaining chip between empires. The national movement was unhappy with the policies of opposing forces toward Belarus after the October Revolution. On March 9th, 1918, the Belarusian People’s Republic (BPR) was declared, and on March 25th, 1918, its independence was proclaimed—celebrated by many Belarusians as the actual Independence Day, known as the Day of Freedom. The recognition of the BPR, whether it was legal or only factual, is still debated today. Germany refused to acknowledge the BPR due to its relationship with Soviet Russia. The Brest Peace Treaty, signed by RSFSR, Germany, the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria, allocated part of Belarus and the territories of the Baltic countries to Germany.
The influence of Soviet ideology on history and historiography has made it challenging to discuss the GDL and the BNR as periods of Belarusian statehood for a long time. Repression against the national intelligentsia and Russification of the language through textbooks established Belarus as a “continuation of Russia” in discourse.
Belarus under Lukashenko: a pro-Russian dictatorship
Despite the apparent end of the era of the Russian and Soviet empires, the modern state of Belarus, with the support of Russia, is contributing to Russia’s ongoing expansion. It’s worth noting that the country’s leadership is responsible for creating the conditions that enable this situation, as Belarus ranks 22nd from the bottom in the democracy index. The country’s long-standing dictator, Lukashenko, shows his loyalty to Russia through his words and actions to receive aid. While receiving preferential energy prices may benefit regular people (though one could argue whether such benefits serve as “compensation” for Lukashenko’s economic errors in other sectors—or are the result of Russian colonization), the creation of a military reserve in Russia to quash protests in Belarus serves more to further Lukashenko’s interests.
The policy of Russification may be used by the Belarusian government not so much to earn political points with Russia but rather to weaken the political potential of its citizens by blocking avenues to create horizontal connections through “national” channels. It’s crucial to note that Russia supports this policy and backs it up with its own “soft power,” such as the work of Russian propaganda media within Belarus.
The Belarusian (illegitimate) government supported Russian expansion in various ways. One example is the use of Belarusian territories and infrastructure for the invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, Belarus is heavily reliant on Russia economically, as Russia is its primary creditor, importer, and exporter. The two countries have similar commodity structures for exports and imports, except for energy resources imported from Russia and meat and dairy products exported from Belarus. This dependence is not equal due to the size difference between the economies. Lev Lvovski, a senior researcher at the Belarusian Economic Research and Outreach Center (BEROC), has noted that without Russia refinancing its debts, Belarus would fall into a debt pit. Additionally, hundreds of thousands of Belarusian citizens live and work in Russia, further reinforcing political and economic dependencies between the two nations.
The Lukashenko regime also contributes to the “Russian” cultural expansion by prioritizing the Russian language in education and culture. Over the years, Belarusian-language schools have been closing at a much higher rate than Russian-language schools. From 2012 to 2018, 615 schools disappeared in Belarus, of which 78% were Belarusian-language (i.e., closed much more often than Russian-language schools). This is especially noticeable near Russia, with only one Belarusian-language urban school remaining in the entire Vitebsk region in 2019 and just three in the Gomel region. The number of students enrolled in rural schools in Belarus is five times lower than in urban schools, resulting in a significant imbalance in the ratio of schools with Belarusian and Russian languages of education. As a result, only 11% of students are taught in Belarusian, even though the ratio of schools is 45% Belarusian and 55% Russian. First-graders in Russian-language schools only study the Belarusian language for one hour per week and do not study Belarusian literature at all. Furthermore, the number of “lessons on the language and literature of national minorities” is lower than for any of the state languages, including Polish, Lithuanian, and Hebrew.
Moreover, Russian influence has manifested itself physically in the names of places in Belarusian cities. According to Yandex data cited by Radio Svaboda, in 2017, there were twenty times fewer streets in Belarus named after national figures than Russian and Soviet figures. National place names are often relegated to the outskirts of cities. For instance, while there are 440 km of streets named after Lenin in Belarus, streets named after the first Belarusian printer Skorina are less than 50 km in total length. In contrast, the length of “Soviet” streets is almost 700 km, while streets named “Independence” are only 40 km long.
In Minsk, there are streets named after Russian political figures from different eras, including medieval politicians. Many streets are named after those responsible for repressions against the national intelligentsia and mass repressions by the NKVD on Belarusian territory. For instance, in 1977, Shurangovich street was named in Minsk after the man responsible for deporting and repressing over 12,000 Belarusians and executing more than 3,000 of them. The street remains unrenamed to this day. Additionally, there is resistance from the state system toward the inclusion of national place names. For example, the street named after Vasil Bykov, an existentialist writer who advocated for a national and independent Belarus, is only present in the village of Zhdanovichi in the Minsk region.
At the forefront of repressions, in the shadow of Russia
Russia is often seen as a symbol of totalitarian cruelty by the global North and Russians themselves. However, Belarus actually ranks higher in lack of freedom, according to Freedom House, with only eight political and civil freedoms observed compared to Russia’s nineteen. Suppose one delves into the politics and culture of Belarus. In that case, it becomes clear that the repression in Belarus is more destructive, dehumanizing and depriving all the rights of people falling under it. While Alexei Navalny is able to use Twitter being detained, Maria Kolesnikova and Viktor Babariko are imprisoned without the right to correspondence, and information about their lives is only available through their lawyers.
Belarus has been a testing ground for laws that have subsequently been introduced in Russia over the past decade and has proposed repressive innovations inspired by Russia and its financial support of pro-government groups.
Belarus has imposed severe restrictions on freedom of speech in the form of compulsory liquidation of media and NGOs, censorship, blocking access to news sites from Belarus, imprisonment for subscribing to Telegram channels and reposts, and trials of journalists reporting on torture and crimes committed by law enforcement—all this happened earlier than in Russia. However, little of this has received much resonance outside Belarus.
Freedom of assembly is restricted in all spheres of the country, and Belarusians are persecuted in their homes, at work, and in public spaces. While Russians may be arrested or fined for single pickets, Belarusians risk long-term imprisonment for hanging a white-red bedsheet on their balcony or wearing a yellow-blue jacket.
Belarusian ultraconservatives, who have extensive ties to Russia and receive financial and non-financial support (as described in Daria Tryd’s documentary “The Council”), frequently launch attacks on Belarusian culture and society. Since the introduction of the law prohibiting the “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relationships” in Russia, several dozen similar legislative initiatives have appeared in Belarus, which continue to push for the adoption of such a law to this day.
Russians often judge life in Belarus based on their own experiences in Russia, without recognizing the difference in contexts - including how the lack of political freedom for Belarusian citizens is connected to both past and present Russian imperial influence.
Copy of a copy
Belarus often becomes a “shadow”—a copy of what is happening inside Russia with minor adjustments. For example, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya is viewed in broad liberal discussions as a replica of Alexei Navalny, the 2020 protests are considered similar to the Bolotnaya protests, and mass arrests and torture in prisons are phenomena familiar to Russians, although happening more locally and less frightening. However, the larger scale of the situation in Belarus seems to be overlooked, where a population of 9.4 million has 1458 political prisoners compared to 1107 in Russia, which has a population of 144.1 million.
While some global Northern countries describe Belarus as the “last dictatorship in Europe,” it may not be the case considering the conservative takeover in Hungary and Poland. For Russia, Belarus is seen as a peripheral state with a comical dictator who can be the subject of memes and should not be taken seriously. The reality of atrocities such as shooting at protesters, the death penalty, unfair imprisonment terms for fabricated cases, mass political imprisonment, cruel torture, and violence in prisons is fading into the background while Russians laugh and show “where the attack on Belarus was prepared from.”
The uniqueness of the situation in Belarus, which cannot be directly translated into the context of Russia, is lost. Russians seem to believe that they can adopt symbols of Belarusian national resistance, such as the white-red-white flag, translated into a blue-and-white copy, without acknowledging the appropriation of the history and meanings of these symbols.
The Belarusian Analytical Workshop conducted a study which found that 80% of Belarusians have a negative view towards the possibility of sending Belarusian troops into Ukraine. Furthermore, approximately one-third of those surveyed believe that Belarus is aiding Russian military aggression. The study’s authors noted that responses to questions related to the war in Ukraine were formed right after the full-scale invasion and have remained mostly unchanged as of October 2022.
Since the start of the full-scale war, a segment of Belarusians have actively joined the anti-war movement in various ways. Activists and human rights defenders have been detained since February 24th. Protests took place in Belarus from February 26th to 28th against the referendum to make further constitutional changes that would strengthen Lukashenko’s position. These protests quickly turned into anti-war demonstrations, resulting in the detention of at least 1,100 people who received 15-30 days of administrative arrest and faced cruel treatment and torture. Cyberpartisans continue their work by attacking power and transportation infrastructure within Belarus, monitoring Russian military activities and crimes in Ukraine. They also verify Belarusians who want to join the Ukrainian armed resistance, and hundreds of such individuals have been identified.
Belsat released a review on Belarusian resistance against the war in Ukraine at the end of 2022. It stated that Belarusian rail partisans conducted over 80 diversions on the railway during the first six weeks of the full-scale war. According to a Washington Post investigation, their efforts helped prevent an attack on Kyiv. Partisans who were identified by Belarusian law enforcement received sentences of up to 23 years in a strict regime colony. One of them, Vitaly Melnik, was even shot in the knees during his arrest.
Belarusian feminist, queer, and anarchist activists are involved in building volunteer networks that help refugees from Ukraine, Ukrainian anti-authoritarian forces, and initiatives.
Solidarity with Ukraine
In this text, we unequivocally condemn Russia and Belarus for their criminal, military actions in attacking Ukraine. We demand an end to the war and that the aggressor countries be held accountable for their crimes.
Addressing the international community, we call for more decisive and conscious support for Ukraine and opposition to Russia:
- Provide Ukraine with all requested weapons.
- Write off Ukraine’s international debt.
- Stop the export of Russian energy resources.
- Strengthen control over the enforcement of personal sanctions against the Russian political, oligarchic, and propagandistic elite.
Furthermore, we want to emphasize the nature of this war as continuing the colonial tradition rather than being solely related to the ambitions of specific Russian oligarchs and politicians. We must dismantle the "Russian world" project, including its influence on the Russian opposition.
Belarus needs to undergo decolonization. It is essential to create an environment for open and broad public discussions on what decolonization means and how to achieve it. Belarus must be freed from the coercive influence and detrimental economic dependence on Russia, contributing to its crimes. To this end, economic, linguistic, and anti-discriminatory reforms in the interests of the population, not the pro-Russian apparatus, are necessary.
It should be noted that support for the war and the Putin regime is incompatible with the decolonial perspective. Attempts to tie them together by people from the Americas or the EU demonstrate a lack of understanding of local contexts. When the same happens in Russia, it is a propagandistic tactic to capture and repaint critical narratives in opposite colors.